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Abstract  
 
Many cognitive and neuroscientists attempt to assign biological functions to brain structures.  To achieve this end, 
scientists perform experiments that relate the physical properties of brain structures to organism-level abilities, behaviors, 
and environmental stimuli.  Researchers make use of various measuring instruments and methodological techniques to 
obtain this kind of relational evidence, ranging from single-unit electrophysiology and optogenetics to whole brain 
functional MRI.  Each experiment is intended to identify brain function.  However, seemingly independent of 
experimental evidence, many cognitive scientists, neuroscientists, and philosophers of science assume that the brain 
processes information as a scientific fact.  In this work we analyze categories of relational evidence and find that although 
physical features of specific brain areas selectively covary with external stimuli and abilities, and that the brain shows 
reliable causal organization, there is no direct evidence supporting the claim that information processing is a natural 
function of the brain.  We conclude that the belief in brain information processing adds little to the science of cognitive 
science and functions primarily as a metaphor for efficient communication of neuroscientific data. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Many of us believe that the brain processes information.  
Bechtel and Richardson (2010), as philosophers of 
cognitive science, consider it uncontroversial that 
cognitive scientists involved in neuroimaging research 
believe that “the brain contains some regions that are 
specialized for processing specific types of information” 
(p. 241).  Neuroscientists too claim that “the principle 
function of the central nervous system is to represent and 
transform information” (deCharms & Zador 2000, p. 
613).  Given such wide-spread acceptance of a belief, it is 
appropriate to ask for the justification of this belief.  If 
the justification is empirical and experimental, then we 
should look to the research reported by working scientists 
in the field; if it is metaphysical, then we should look to 
the arguments of philosophers and theoreticians. 
      
We will no doubt discover both kinds of justification if 
we look for it.  Yet we assume that cognitive scientists, 
when stating that the brain processes information, are 
primarily stating an empirical fact or a widely agreed-
upon scientific proposition that is supported by a body of 
experimental evidence.  Like the physicist who can back 
up the proposition ‘protons have spin’ with a presentation 
of the experimental evidence, we expect that the 
cognitive scientist should be able to do the same 
regarding a statement about the brain.  If the cognitive 
scientist cannot do this, then the proposition is non-
empirical or unscientific.  We are not suggesting a 
definition of science or solving Popper’s demarcation 
problem, but we are appealing to the belief that accepted 
scientific statements are associated with experimental 
evidence.  Without associated evidence, a proposition 
cannot be scientific. 
      
Our task here, however, is somewhat more involved than 
an objective review of the scientific literature.  As we 
have learned from philosophers of science over the past 
century, “theory dominates the experimental work from 
its initial planning up to the finishing touches in the 
laboratory” (Popper 1959, p. 90).  Hanson (1958) and 
Kuhn (1962) were among the first to direct our attention 
to the theory-ladenness of scientific observation.  
Brewster (2001) extended this position, arguing that the 
complete scientific process, which includes attention, 
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perception, data interpretation, memory, and scientific 
communication, is influenced by theory.  Perhaps most 
relevant to our work is Popper’s warning that 
“…observation statements and statements of 
experimental results, are always interpretations of the 
facts observed…they are interpretations in the light of 
theories” (italics in original, p. 90).  Of course, none of 
this need imply scientific relativism, and relativism is not 
assumed in this work. 
      
One may presume that only cognitive scientists are 
qualified to interpret the experimental evidence in the 
field.  While an expert’s assessment carries more weight 
than the non-involved observer, it is reasonable that 
anyone who takes time to understand the evidence and its 
methods of acquisition is in a position to construct an 
interpretation.  The force of the interpretation should be 
based upon the reason of the argument and not only its 
source.  Nonetheless, we have performed some of the 
types of experiments that we are now interpreting. 
      
Cognitive scientific evidence, especially neuroimaging 
evidence, has been increasingly subjected to criticisms.  
To better demarcate our position, we highlight that we are 
not specifically arguing between distributed versus 
localized processing in the brain (Utel 2001; Hardcastle 
& Stewart 2002; Bunzl et al. 2010), and we are not 
pointing out the previously discussed technical-
methodological limitations of brain assessing 
technologies (Logothetis 2008; Roskies 2007; Klein 
2009).  We do share with these authors the broader 
concern for interpretations of evidence in the field of 
cognitive science, and how theoretical assumptions 
influence interpretations of evidence, ultimately ending in 
statements made by cognitive scientists that carry the 
weight of scientific fact.  These facts, in turn, are used by 
naturalistic philosophers of mind to constrain 
philosophical theory and argument.  
 
2. Some cognitive science evidence types 
 
The scientific statement that we will consider is Bechtel 
and Richardson’s proposition “the brain contains some 
regions that are specialized for processing specific types 
of information,” although, since we are not specifically 
arguing against localization of brain function, we will 
consider simultaneously the more general proposition P 
‘the brain processes information.’  deCharms and Zador 
say that it is the function of the brain to process (represent 
and transform) information.  There is no philosophical 
consensus on how to define a natural biological function, 
and we will assume that processing information is a 
natural function of the brain like pumping blood is a 
natural function of the heart.   
      
One might expect our forthcoming analysis to be guided 
by a preliminary definition of information processing, but 
this will not be our method.   Rather, we will directly 
consider the neurobiological evidence that scientists and 
philosophers presume to support information processing 
in the brain, and argue that this evidence does not yet 
justify propositions about the specific functioning of 
brain tissue, information processing or otherwise.  We 
realize that this claim may initially (and perhaps finally) 
sound ridiculous to those practicing in the field of 
cognitive science.  Of course, a manuscript on 
information processing would not be complete without 
reference to Claude Shannon’s understanding of 
information, and we will show that his communication 
model, although immeasurably useful in modern 
technology and sometimes appropriately used in 
neuroscience, does not analogously apply to the 
communication between environment and brain. 
      
Cognitive scientists, instead of claiming to discover the 
function of brain tissue, often speak of identifying 
cognitive operations with brain tissue or networks 
(Henson 2006; Bechtel 2008b).  This difference does not 
substantially change our arguments.  On Bechtel’s view, 
cognitive operations are analogous to material operations, 
such as oxidizing a chemical substrate, where the 
cognitive substrates are mental representations, and the 
cognitive operations are transformations of these 
representations.  In this sense, information processing is 
the act of performing cognitive operations, and the 
function of brain structures is to perform cognitive 
operations.  We are therefore also arguing that the 
scientific evidence does not support the proposition that 
the brain performs cognitive operations. 
      
We wish to consider the experimental evidence that 
justifies P.  We guess there are tens of thousands of 
papers in scientific journals that may be used as evidence, 
thus a systematic evaluation of every paper independently 
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and subsequent integration of the evidence is not feasible.   
The task must be simplified, but in a way that addresses 
the initial question.  As a first step, we will only consider 
research that involves measuring or manipulating the 
physical properties of brain.  While a study that does not 
involve brain properties may contribute to our scientific 
understanding of the brain, it can only do so indirectly by 
prompting theory formation and characterizing 
behavioral phenomena.  For example, in 1908 Yerkes and 
Dodson discovered that performance on a task at first 
increases with increasing arousal and then decreases once 
arousal levels become too great.  They quantified the 
intuition that ‘stress’ can enhance performance.  This 
interesting and useful finding may suggest 
neurophysiological correlates of performance and 
arousal, but it does not experimentally justify any 
statement about brain function in a direct sense. 
      
We are primarily interested with research that 
investigates the relations between physical brain 
properties and behaviors, abilities, or physical (sensory) 
contexts.  Cognitive scientists, and philosophers of 
science, typically reference the evidence from this 
category of research when making claims about brain 
function.  Relational evidence, as we will call it, can be 
broken down into four major categories: 
   1)  structure/ability studies,  
   2)  external-stimulus/brain-response studies,  
   3)  task/brain-response studies, and  
   4)  brain-manipulation/behavioral-response studies.   
     
 In structure/ability (or S/A) studies, researchers relate the 
structure or structural states of the brain to the absence or 
presence of particular behaviors or abilities.  Paul Broca 
(1861) popularized this type of research with his lesion-
deficit, or lesion study, when he discovered an individual 
who could only speak the syllable ‘tan’.  A post-mortem 
analysis of the person’s brain revealed damaged brain 
tissue in the posterior part of the left inferior frontal 
gyrus—a region now known as Broca’s area. Thus Broca 
related the ability to produce fluent speech to the left 
inferior frontal gyrus.  The class of S/A studies includes 
more than lesion studies since any physical feature of the 
brain (e.g. patterns of white matter connectivity) may be 
associated with the absence or presence of specific 
abilities. 
      
The structure in S/A studies refers to the physical 
structure of the brain as measured by a variety of 
measuring techniques, the most basic being gross 
anatomical observation of brain tissue.   Other measuring 
techniques include, but are not limited to, histological 
examination, molecular analysis, electroencephalo-
graphy (EEG), magnetoencephalogray (MEG), computed 
tomography (CT), positron emissions tomography (PET), 
single photon emitted computed tomography (SPECT), 
structural magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), diffusion 
tensor imaging (DTI),  magnetic resonance spectroscopy 
(MRS), and others.  By ability we mean any observable 
behavior that can be done by an animal or human, such as 
the ability to count out loud, to raise one’s arm, to 
navigate a maze, to write a sentence, to score above 
chance on a test, etc. 
      
In external-stimulus/brain-response (ES/BR) studies, the 
experimenter systematically manipulates a physical 
feature of an organism’s external environment, and 
measures temporally coincident properties of the 
organism’s brain.  The response need not occur precisely 
simultaneous with the stimulus and is typically extended 
in time.  Edgar Adrian is generally credited with 
pioneering stimulus-response studies of nervous tissue.  
He was the first to record the electrical activity of single 
nerve fibers, and was subsequently awarded a Nobel 
Prize in 1932 for his work.  As an example of his prolific 
research, he isolated an eel’s eye and optic nerve, 
attached electrodes to the nerve, and recorded the 
electrical activity to varying lighting situations (Adrian & 
Matthews 1927). 
      
Brain responses in ES/BR studies are recorded using a 
variety of techniques based upon electromagnetic brain 
properties, including single-unit intra and extracellular 
recording, evoked potentials, EEG, MEG, and others.  
Functional MRI (fMRI) is a popular tool used by 
cognitive scientists to assess brain properties in response 
to an ES.  Proper interpretation of the fMRI signal itself 
requires technical background knowledge (Roskies 2007; 
Logothetis 2008).  Briefly, the fMRI signal is a 
consequence of the magnetic properties of blood 
components which covary with local metabolic demands.   
Other common techniques in ES/BR studies include PET 
and optical imaging.   
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When, within a research protocol, a brain-response is 
recorded while the organism is performing a particular 
task or activity, we call this a task/brain-response (T/BR) 
study.  The form of the T/BR study is similar to ES/BR 
studies, except the process of completing the task is ‘self-
directed’ rather than under complete control of the 
experimenter.   Often T/BR studies include ES aspects as 
well.  Memory research provides typical examples.  
Poppenk et al. (2010), in studying prospective memory 
which is described as the ability to act out postponed 
intentions at future times, presented a series of visual 
scenes (ES) to subjects and instructed the subjects to 
either imagine performing an action associated with the 
visual scene, or to use the scene as a reminder to perform 
an action the next time the same scene was viewed.  
FMRI was used to measure properties of the subjects’ 
brains during the tasks.  Notice that although the 
experimenter controls the ES and the task command 
directly, she cannot control the process by which the 
subject completes the task. 
      
Brain-manipulation/behavioral response (BM/BR) studies 
differ from ES/BR and T/BR studies in that physical 
properties of the brain are directly controlled or 
manipulated while a behavioral response is observed.  
Technologies used for BM include lesioning, gene-
expression, direct current stimulation, electrode-based 
deep brain stimulation, transcranial magnetic stimulation, 
and light-based optogenetic stimulation, among others.  
Optogenetic studies are a relatively recent advance.  They 
are based upon the introduction of light-activated 
channels into specific populations of neurons, permitting 
relatively precise control of action potential generation in 
live organisms (Zhang et al. 2007).  For example,  Wyart 
et al. (2009) expressed light sensitive genes within so-
called Kolmer-Agdur cells of the zebrafish, and then non-
invasively manipulated the neuronal activity of these 
cells which modulated the swimming behavior of the 
animal. 
 
3. Interpretations of the evidence 
 
We wish to determine if research studies from the 
categories of relational evidence discussed thus far justify 
the scientific claim P that the brain processes 
information.  Again, we will not consider every study; 
rather, we will start with a typical example from each 
category of evidence and attempt to generalize our 
conclusions to the category.   
 
3.1  S/A studies 
 
Beginning with Broca, what can we infer from his S/A 
study of subject ‘Tan’, who appeared to understand 
speech but could only speak the syllable ‘tan’, and more 
specifically, how do we clarify the relationship between a 
brain structure and the inability to produce fluent, 
complex language (Broca’s aphasia)?  A few preliminary 
remarks are necessary.  We realize that the scientific 
community’s understanding of Broca’s aphasia has 
grown tremendously since the time of Broca, and that our 
simplistic description of Broca’s aphasia as the inability 
to produce grammatically correct language is a gross 
description that, although clinically standard, has been 
challenged by experts and is surely incomplete 
(Grodzinsky 2000).  Here we are focused on the process 
of relating brain structure to function.  For our purposes 
an accurate description of Broca’s aphasia is unnecessary 
because our argument will challenge the logic of inferring 
brain functions given correlations between brain 
structures and observed abilities in general. 
     
It is clear that Broca’s area lesions and Broca’s aphasia 
are related in the sense that they can occur 
contemporaneously within a single individual.  It is also 
clear that Broca’s lesion and Broca’s aphasia need not be 
contemporaneous, for 85% of patients with chronic 
Broca’s aphasia have lesions in Broca’s area, and only 
50-60% of patients with lesions in Broca’s area have a 
persisting Broca’s aphasia (Dronkers 2000).  Further, 
surgical excision of Broca’s area—a brain 
manipulation/behavioral response study—has led only to 
transient mutism followed by recovery of the patient to 
normal.  This evidence alone is enough to at least 
challenge claims of understanding the function of Broca’s 
area.  One can of course speculate on the functioning of a 
brain area given an imperfect statistical correlation 
between that brain area and an observed ability, but any 
claims of knowledge of function are excessive: we have 
knowledge of the correlation and not the function. 
      
Let us assume, falsely, that Broca’s lesions and Broca’s 
aphasia are perfectly correlated in the sense that 100% of 
patients with Broca’s aphasia have lesions and 100% of 
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patients with lesions have aphasia, for it is possible that 
other S/A studies exhibit perfect correlation.  From this 
finding, can we conclude that perfect correlation between 
structural brain states and particular abilities justifies P?  
This would at first appear to depend upon the nature of 
the ability being studied, but it is not clear that any S/A 
study could empirically justify that the brain processes 
information.  In S/A studies, one may try to infer brain 
operations given a correlated ability.  There is a tendency 
to argue that the structural brain area that is correlated 
with an ability is in fact performing a process 
proximately responsible for the ability, but this is not the 
logic of S/A studies.  The logic of S/A studies is as 
follows: if a subject with structural pattern S cannot do A, 
but a subject without S can do A, then the ability to 
perform A must depend upon S in some way.  Even if we 
accept this logic—which requires that the subjects are 
similar in every other way except S—we cannot logically 
infer that the function of S is to perform an operation 
‘directly responsible’ for A.  With regard to Broca’s 
aphasia, the fact that a person produces agrammatical 
speech after a brain lesion does not logically imply that 
the damaged brain area organizes linguistic grammar. 
      
It should be clear that directly attributing function based 
upon S/A studies is not logically justified.  Consider this 
example.  There were many times when my computer, 
the computer I am using to write this, loses a particular 
ability that I expect it to have.  I recall a time when I was 
unable to run programs I typically run, and other 
programs began running very slowly or would shut down 
for no apparent reason in mid-session.  The problem 
turned out to be a dead CPU fan.  Should we say that the 
function of the CPU fan is to run programs quickly and 
prevent them from shutting down?  The abilities in 
question correlated with the spinning of the fan, but the 
fan does not perform the absent abilities—the function of 
the fan is to cool down the CPU.  The CPU fan 
participates in a series of causal interactions that run 
programs when ‘everything is working’,  and we could 
similarly argue, given the results of a S/A study, that a 
structural feature of the brain participates in causal 
interactions that realize a particular ability under certain 
conditions.  This does not entail, given a S/A study, that 
the function of the brain structure is to perform a process 
proximately responsible for the ability in question. 
      
In S/A studies, functions are always speculatively 
inferred from observed abilities.  We do not study how 
the dynamic processes of the brain area and its relations 
to the rest of the organism causally make the ability 
possible—but this is presumably what we need to 
understand if we are to assign a function (or operation) to 
the brain area in question.   Broca’s area is more 
selectively related to the ability to produce grammatically 
appropriate speech than some other parts of the organism.  
One may argue that the selective correlation between 
Broca’s area and Broca’s aphasia justifies the scientific 
claim that Broca’s area processes linguistic information, 
but the ability ‘to process linguistic information’ plays no 
obvious role in the study.   To justify the claim that 
Broca’s area processes linguistic information given the 
evidence of a related S/A study—a claim made but many 
scientists in the field—we would have to assume that 
speaking grammatically appropriate speech involves 
linguistic information processing by the organism 
somewhere (because this is the only way that processes 
and operations enter into S/A studies.  We do not observe 
brain area operations; we observe the functioning 
organism), and then further identify the ability to process 
linguistic information with the function of Broca’s area.  
But neither of these steps is empirically justified.  No one 
directly measures linguistic information processing in the 
study—we simply observe the form and content of 
speech—and the identification of an organism’s ability 
with the functioning of a brain area is a speculative 
inference.  This does not imply that Broca’s area plays no 
role in the ability to produce fluent speech—we simply 
do not know what that role is given limited evidence and 
theory. 
      
There is another problem with inferring functions from 
S/A studies which follows from the theory-ladeness of 
observations.  In S/A studies, we observe abilities and 
physical brain properties.  While there is less debate 
about how to describe brain properties, the way we 
describe abilities is not well-defined.  This presents a 
problem, for the function that we attribute to the brain 
area becomes dependent upon how we describe and 
interpret the ability that is absent.  With regard to Broca’s 
aphasia, Broca himself did not describe the absent ability 
as a deficit in grammar or aphasia, but rather as an 
articulation deficit, focusing on the motor aspects of 
speech.  Seen this way, we would infer that the function 
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of Broca’s area is to orchestrate the motor production of 
speech, or process speech motor information. Later 
commentators have sought to increasingly refine and 
abstract their interpretations of the absent ability in 
Broca’s patients.  For instance, Grodzinsky (2000) 
‘observes’ that the absent ability demonstrated by 
Broca’s aphasiacs is a specific syntactic ability: 
…the computation of the relation between 
transformationally moved phrasal constituents 
and their extraction sites (in line with the Trace-
Deletion Hypothesis)...the construction of higher 
parts of the syntactic tree in speech production.  
(p. 1) 
Thus Grodzinsky says that the function of Broca’s area is 
to perform this very specific syntactic ability, but his 
interpretation is based upon a relatively advanced 
linguistic theory that is not a fact but a theory itself.  As 
our theories of language and language producing 
organisms advance—as they did through Chomsky’s 
work, for instance—our descriptions of the absent 
abilities may change, throwing suspect upon seemingly 
empirical statements of brain function.  Perhaps this 
criticism is too general, but our way of interpreting 
abilities is not as firmly grounded as our measurements of 
brain properties, yet the cognitive scientist projects this 
interpreted ability onto the brain structure, claiming that 
the interpreted ability is the objective or natural function 
of the brain structure. Further, we may reasonably 
describe abilities in mutually compatible ways, all of 
which are true, but which generate disparate functional 
assignments for a particular brain structure (which is one 
reason why cognitive scientists can disagree so strongly 
about the function of a brain structure while considering 
the same body of experimental evidence). 
      
Apart from the interpretational problems associated with 
identified abilities, there is also the problem of 
identifying which abilities are absent or present in S/A 
studies in the first place.  For example, in Broca’s lesions, 
the inability to produce grammatically correct language 
may be a salient and obvious deficit that we notice 
immediately, but this salience may detract from other 
deficits (or new abilities) that also accompany Broca’s 
lesions.  While researchers have subsequently tested 
Broca’s aphasiacs for other deficits—such as 
mathematical abilities, language comprehension, and 
others—they have not been tested for every ability 
imaginable, or even for a broad range of non-linguistic 
abilities.  But certainly Broca’s aphasiacs may lose or 
acquire other abilities that we simply have not 
empirically assessed.  These abilities need not be 
obvious, and may only become apparent through very 
specific and creative testing by the scientist.  Therefore 
the operations or functions we assign to brain structures, 
based upon S/A studies, are dependent upon the small 
sub-set of organism-level abilities that we have decided 
to look at; abilities that may be interpreted in different but 
compatible ways.  These problems do not similarly arise 
when studying physical processes, such as cellular 
metabolism, where we select to look at particular 
physical objects and their interactions, and discover the 
role those objects and interactions play in the organism. 
For instance, one can study cellular processes (in a gel or 
Petri dish) independent of the organism and learn much 
about function.  In contrast, we cannot remove a piece of 
brain tissue from the organism and expect to learn 
anything about the type of cognitive operations it 
performs.   
      
We will not address other S/A studies as the form of our 
argument applies to all studies that attempt to relate brain 
structures and organism abilities.  In summary, the 
evidence in S/A studies is composed of correlations 
between brain structures and organism-level abilities.  To 
arrive at claims of information processing in the brain 
from S/A studies, one must first infer that the brain 
structure performs an operation or function that directly 
enacts the organism-level ability in question, but this 
inference is speculative, biased, and not logically sound. 
In a second layer of interpretation, one must identify the 
function with information processing, but this 
identification enters as an assumption independent of the 
evidence. 
 
3.2  ES/BR studies 
 
External-stimulus/brain-response studies address 
questions of brain function more directly than S/A studies 
and are probably the largest category of relational 
evidence.   Edgar Adrian, in his pioneering ES/BR 
research, measured the electrical responses of single 
sensory cells, such as stretch receptors, while they were 
fixed to particular weights.  He observed that a cell’s 
electrical responses are in the form of stereotyped action 
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potentials, or spikes, and that the rate of producing spikes 
increases as the weight increases.  Thus the rate, or 
frequency, of spikes during a fixed time period is able to 
predict the magnitude of the stimulus. 
      
These early experiments established that single cell 
responses and stimulus magnitudes may reliably covary 
with each other.  While magnitudes and intensities are 
important properties of stimuli, they are not the only 
properties of environmental stimuli that are relevant to an 
organism.  In general, a stimulus may be characterized by 
multiple properties.  For example, an auditory stimulus 
may be described by its intensity, frequency spectrum, 
temporal envelope, source direction, source distance, and 
so on.  It is possible that a particular cell responds to one 
of these properties and not the others, or to some 
combination of properties, which suggests that a cell may 
be selective for specific properties or features of the 
stimulus. 
      
Barlow (1953) was perhaps the first to clearly 
demonstrate the feature selectivity of sensory cells (Reike 
et al. 1999).  By recording the electrical activity of retinal 
ganglion cells in the frog, he was able to show that the 
cell’s activity covaries with the location and size of a 
circular spot light on the retina.  After systematically 
varying the light spot’s size and location, Barlow 
determined that the cell’s receptive field—the collection 
of stimulus properties that maximally activated the cell—
is a circularly symmetric form called a center-surround 
field.  Spots of light within a small region of the retina 
activate the cell, but spots of light away from that region 
inhibit it.   
       
Hubel and Wiesel (1962) greatly extended Barlow’s work 
and discovered cells of the striate (visual) cortex that 
have surprisingly complicated receptive fields.  Two of 
these cell types are the so-called simple and complex 
cells, which respond maximally to appropriately oriented 
bars or slits of light.  Some of the cells are relatively 
insensitive to the location of the bar, while others only 
appreciably respond to moving bars.  In describing these 
cells, Hubel says:  
 
We feel that we have at least some understanding 
of a cell if we can say that its duty is to take care 
of a 1 degree by 1 degree region of retina, 6 
degrees to the left of the fovea and 4 degrees 
above it, and to fire whenever a light line on a 
dark background appears, provided it is inclined 
at about 45 degrees. (Hubel 1962, p. 168) 
      
The evidence from these pioneering ES/BR electro-
physiological studies cannot be interpreted without the 
concept of selective response.   Selective response means, 
loosely, that the cell fires action potentials only when the 
‘right’ stimulus is present.   Put more rigorously, 
selective response refers to two characteristics of 
neuronal cells: (1) the rate or pattern of firing action 
potentials (the spike train) covaries with specific stimulus 
properties, and (2) different cells may respond differently 
to the same stimulus.  Both characteristics are typically 
implied when referring to the selectivity of cells in 
ES/BR studies.  If someone discovered a neuron that 
exhibited (1), but on subsequent research discovered that 
all neurons exhibited (1) in the same way, one would not 
say that the initial neuron was selective for the stimulus, 
even though it exhibited selectivity for some stimuli 
among others.  As well, the fact that different neurons 
respond differently to similar stimuli does not imply (1), 
since neuronal responses may be random in response to 
stimuli.  Condition (1) is a form of within neuron 
stimulus selectivity, while condition (2) is a form of 
between neuron stimulus selectivity. For ES/BR studies 
such as Hubel and Wiesel’s, when an ES is chosen and 
controlled by the researcher,  we assume that the relation 
between the ES and BR is causal, as this assumption does 
not change our interpretation of selectively, even though 
we use the term ‘covaries’  which has statistical 
connotations. 
      
We are now in a position to evaluate whether Hubel and 
Wiesel’s ground-breaking ES/BR studies justify the claim 
that the brain processes information.  In this case we are 
asking if specific neurons, complex cells of the striate 
cortex, process or carry information.  The experimental 
evidence consists of recorded responses of complex cells 
that demonstrate stimulus selectivity in the senses of (1) 
and (2).  It seems that selectivity in the sense of (2) does 
not provide any justification that complex cells process 
information; the fact that different cells respond 
differently to the same stimulus suggests only that the 
cells are different in some way. 
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Claims of information processing, if they are justified by 
this experiment, must follow from the evidence that 
complex-cell spike trains covary with the properties of 
visual stimuli, or in causal language, that different visual 
stimuli cause different complex cell spike trains.  
Considering the latter causal language, the fact that 
different causes reliably produce different effects when 
mediated by the same cell does not appear to justify the 
claim that the cell processes information, unless one takes 
that fact to be a definition of information processing 
itself.  Even so, this type of causal relationship appears 
everywhere one looks.  A particular pool ball when hit by 
other balls with different masses and velocities will 
undergo different effects.   The pool ball may not 
appreciably move when stimulated by light or sound at 
typical intensities.  The selectivity of the pool ball to 
acquire different velocities in response to different causal 
‘stimuli’ does not appear fundamentally different than the 
selectivity of a complex cell, especially if the visual 
stimulus is taken to be a space-time collection of photons. 
      
On closer analysis, there is a difference between the 
causality in the pool ball example and the relation 
between the ES and BR of complex cells.   The pool ball 
example involves direct physical contact and an exchange 
of energy and momentum, while the causal response of 
the complex cell is more indirect.  Photons travel through 
the lens of the eye and are absorbed by photoreceptor 
cells of the retina.  Absorption of photons causes the 
release of the neurotransmitter glutamate at synapses onto 
so-called bipolar cells, causing the electrical field across 
the membrane of these cells to become more positive or 
negative, which respectively increases or decreases the 
probability of generating an action potential.  Bipolar 
cells have axons that synapse on other cells, and through 
a series of neuronal connections, influence the membrane 
potential of complex cells and subsequent action potential 
generation.  The causal chain from photons to complex 
cell response is complicated and likely includes causal 
feedback, yet it is not obvious that a complicated causal 
chain is necessarily information processing.   
       
Even more worrisome is the fact that selective causation 
need not imply that the BR has any functional relation to 
the ES at all.  Nothing rules out the possibility that those 
selective correlations are accidental—not in the sense that 
the correlations are statistically spurious, but that those 
correlations are functionally irrelevant to the stimuli of 
interest.  As an analogy, suppose my computer has a CPU 
fan with a blue LED light on the fan.  The light, however, 
is unlit and the fan isn’t spinning.  It happens that when I 
kick my computer just so on the left side of the front 
cover, the LED lights up, the fan begins spinning but 
stops after a second or two, and the light goes out.  If I 
kick it again, just so, it starts up for a second then stops.  I 
can reliably cause the fan to turn on for a bit.  When I 
kick the computer in other places, or shake it up, or sing 
to it, nothing happens to the fan.  The fan is selectively 
correlated with a specific kick.  Perhaps there are 
hundreds of computers, constructed at the same factory, 
that behave similarly.  This selective, causal relationship 
does not imply that the fan is functionally relevant to my 
kicking, or processes kicking information, or represents 
kicking.   This causal relationship may be accidental.   
Why then, given the evidence of selective responses in 
ES/BR studies, do many scientists associate information 
processing with this sort of causation?   
 
3.2.1 Justification of information processing from 
ES/BR studies 
 
There is a strong tendency to associate information 
processing with the results of ES/BR experiments like 
Hubel-Weisel’s.  The spike trains of neurons appear to be 
relaying specific messages about the external 
environment to the organism.  Claude Shannon (1948), 
the founder of mathematical communication theory, 
rigorously defined a model of information transfer that 
may explain this appearance.  In Shannon’s language, the 
physical environment acts as a source that generates a 
message (ES), the message is transformed by a 
transmitter—a sensory organ of the organism—into a 
signal suitable for biological transmission.  The spike 
train (BR) is assumed to be this signal and the neuron to 
be the transmission channel.   These comparisons are 
reasonable, but the next stage of the communication 
model, however, is problematic.   Communication 
requires a receiver that performs the inverse operation of 
the transmitter, or something that reconstructs the 
environmental message from the spike train signal. 
      
The experimental researcher, the one who discovers 
selective correlations between neuronal spike trains and 
environmental messages (stimuli), often plays the 
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surrogate role of the receiver or decoder.  By describing 
relational or mathematical mappings between the ES and 
BR, neuroscientists attempt to ‘read the neural code.’  
But this is not the sort of information transmission we 
were trying to explain.  To complete the biological 
communication model, and to ground information 
transfer, we need to explain how the organism can 
reconstruct the environmental message from its temporal 
pattern of action potentials, and we must demonstrate that 
the organism reproduces a similar environmental message 
within the organism itself.   The neuronal spike train is 
not the message—if anything it is the transmission signal 
or ‘encoded message.’   Although interesting, it is not 
enough to show that spike trains have the capacity to 
represent environmental messages through selective 
covariation.  The fact that researchers can mathematically 
map spike trains back onto stimuli does not say anything 
about how the organism physically reconstructs the 
environmental message.  This capacity to map follows 
immediately from statistical correlations.  Neuroscientists 
who acknowledge these limitations explain that 
mathematically reconstructing stimuli from spike trains 
requires taking the homunculus point of view (Reike et 
al. 1999). 
      
For an organism to receive an environmental message in 
Shannon’s sense, that message must be within the 
organism and have the same structure as the original 
message.  This suggestion may appear radical, but it is 
simply the completion of Shannon’s communication 
model—the same model that supports the intuition that 
the brain processes and transmits information.  For 
example, consider telephonic communication.  Air 
pressure waves may be converted into analog electronic 
messages that are encoded into digital signals and 
transmitted through a physical channel.  This digital 
signal, which does not mirror the sound wave in form, 
reaches a destination where it is reconstructed back into 
an analog message that drives a loudspeaker, reproducing 
the original pressure wave.  If the original message was 
not reproduced (perhaps imperfectly) at a destination, we 
could not claim that communication or information 
transfer took place.  A message is communicated if and 
only if that message is reproduced at the receiver. 
     
If one assumes that the organism receives environmental 
messages, then in accordance with Shannon’s 
communication model, at least the structure of that 
message must be physically reproduced within the 
organism.  The alleged encoded message—or spike 
train—has a physical basis, thus the message ought to 
have a physical basis as well.  This means that the 
scientist would have to demonstrate a set of brain-related 
physical measurements that copy, perhaps imperfectly, 
the structure of an environmental stimulus.  Let us call 
this the brain-image of an environmental message.   It 
would remain for the scientist to describe the mechanisms 
by which neuronal spike trains causally reconstruct the 
brain-image of a particular environmental message. 
      
When decoding spike trains in practice, the neuroscientist 
leaves the animal lab and goes to work at the computer. 
On the computer, spike trains and environmental stimuli 
are given numerical representations.  The creative work 
involves finding mathematical algorithms and 
heuristics—let us call these the decoding procedures—
that link spike trains to stimuli.  When the neuroscientist 
finds a decoding procedure that works, she claims to have 
discovered a neural code.  The problem is that the 
neurons themselves have no physical relation to the 
decoding procedure.  The actual neuronal spike trains in 
the living organism do not reconstruct environmental 
stimuli within the organism using these fabricated 
decoding procedures, or at least the neuroscientist has no 
evidence of this.  If she supposes that other neurons have 
the function of performing the decoding procedures that 
she discovered, and she wishes to find biological 
evidence, then she must record from neurons that 
allegedly perform the decode, and, using similar 
mathematical techniques above, fabricate a secondary 
decoding procedure that links these spike trains to the 
original decoding procedures.  These investigations lead 
to an infinite experimental regress that mirrors the 
epistemological regress of the homunculus argument.  
The only way to stop the regress is to discover the brain-
image of the stimulus. 
      
But no evidence suggests that brain-images exist, so the 
very presence of an encoded message within the brain 
presents a problem.  In other words, why should the brain 
contain encoded messages that transmit environmental 
messages, yet never reproduce the structure of the 
message itself?   The organism requires the actual 
message, and not only an encoded version of it.  At this 
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point our analogy to Shannon’s communication model 
breaks down.  It does not appear that the environment 
communicates a message to the organism, but rather, the 
organism is perhaps translating the environment.  Spike 
trains are not signals corresponding to encoded messages; 
they are the actual messages only in the language of the 
organism, whatever that might mean.  With respect to the 
organism, the message is not encoded in anyway, and 
speaking of a neural code is metaphorical and at times 
misleading.  The analogy has changed from information 
transmission to language translation.  But even the idea 
that spike trains are a language is metaphorical—spikes 
trains need not constitute a private biological language, 
and since Wittgenstein, philosopher’s have questioned 
the coherence of a private language altogether.  Our goal 
here, however, is not to support other metaphors, but to 
show that Shannon’s communication model, which is an 
integral part of modern technology, does not match the 
relation between an ES and BR. 
      
The decoding procedures discovered by neuroscientists 
are useful in that they allow us to predict spike trains 
given environmental stimuli, and stimuli given spike 
trains; but the specific decoding procedures do not tell us 
anything about the function of neuronal populations—
because the decoding algorithms have nothing to do with 
the biology of the organism.  Rather, the capacity to 
successfully predict between stimuli and spike trains via 
decoding is typically taken as evidence that spike trains 
represent stimuli, although the capacity to predict 
immediately follows from the statistical correlations 
between spike trains and stimuli. 
      
There are neuroscientists who consistently, and with 
clearly stated assumptions, apply Shannon’s 
mathematical information theory to neuronal data with 
the goal of quantifying the theoretical channel capacity, 
or bit rate, of spike trains (Strong et al. 1998; Reike et al. 
1999). These interesting applications of information 
theory within neuroscience try to answer the following 
question: assuming spike trains carry Shannon 
information about the environment, how much 
information (in bits) could they carry?  We could ask 
similar questions about the oxygen molecules in one’s 
living room, the ants in an anthill, or the blades of grass 
in one’s yard—although the answers presumably would 
not be as interesting.  The fact that Shannon information 
theory can be rigorously applied to spike trains does not 
imply that the brain processes information. 
      
Other neuroscientists, such as deCharms and Zador 
(2000), repeatedly claim that spike trains carry 
information about the environment as a fact, and suggest 
what it means to carry information: “Imagine recording 
from the neuron labeled B1 during different types of 
stimuli or behaviors and discovering the information that 
this neuron carries about the organism’s environment—
the content of this neuron’s signal” (p. 614-15).  In a 
concrete example about a retinal cell they say that “The 
activity of the neuron will be highly correlated with the 
point of luminance (thus carrying content about this 
input)” (p. 637).  Like in Hubel-Wiesel’s ES/BR 
experiments, we call this evidence the selective 
covariation between stimulus properties and spike trains.   
deCharms and Zador use the word ‘information’ above to 
possibly mean ‘specific properties or features of the 
stimulus.’   Given these examples, we can suppose that 
they would endorse the following argument: (1) spikes 
trains and stimulus properties selectively (and causally) 
covary, and (2) the (representational) content of a spike 
train is the stimulus property that causes that spike train. 
      
deCharms and Zador do not bring forth any other types of 
experimental evidence other than selective covariation to 
justify the claim that spike trains carry informational or 
representational content, although they do stress that the 
representational nature of spikes trains is based upon 
content and function.  We have argued that (1) is a 
statement about the evidence that all of us would agree 
upon, but that (2) does not obviously follow.   The fact 
that an ES and BR selectively covary, through causal 
paths, does not appear sufficient to justify claims of 
representational content, and it has been argued that 
covariation of this sort is not even necessary for 
representational content (Millikan 1989; Bechtel 1998).  
      
We need not expect deCharms and Zador, as 
neuroscientists, to philosophically justify what it means 
for a spike train to carry informational content, yet if 
claims of carrying content do not follow immediately 
from the observed evidence, then we can only assume 
that they are interpreting the evidence or communicating 
the evidence by way of metaphor.  But deCharms and 
Zador, along with many other neuroscientists, speak as 
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though ‘carrying content’ is a straightforward 
experimental fact apart from, or in addition to, selective 
covariation. 
      
From a philosophical perspective, Dretske (1981, 1995) 
argues that regular causal covariation, by itself, implies 
information carrying.  For example, he says that flag 
poles and metal paper clips carry information about 
temperature because the volumes of these metal objects 
are reliably correlated with temperature.  But is it not too 
easy to find this sort of information carrying all around 
us?  And why do the objects in question need to be 
regularly or reliably correlated?  Any two things that are 
causally related, perhaps probabilistically, transmit the 
same sort of thing.  If the flag pole was hit by a lightning 
bolt, does not the flag pole carry information about the 
energy of the lightning bolt?  
      
So long as the causal relations are understood between 
objects c and e, then we might say that e carries 
information about c.  If a situation can be expressed in the 
form of a law-like equation, then any parameter on one 
side of the equation can be said to carry information 
about a parameter on the other side equation, such as the 
ideal gas law PV=nRT.  If the conditions are 
probabilistic, then we can use probability theory to derive 
the distribution of one variable given another, so long as 
we have some understanding of the physical connections 
between variables. Carrying information, at least 
according to Dretske, follows directly from knowing the 
causal relations between two physical situations, or from 
minimally knowing that two situations are statistically 
correlated.  If by processing information neuroscientists 
and philosophers mean that stimulus properties causally 
or statistically covary with regionally specific neuronal 
activity, then we agree with P, although we suggest 
abandoning P in favor of more empirically-grounded 
statements about covariation. 
 
3.2.2  Other philosophical justification of information 
in ES/BR studies 
 
Considering similar ES/BR experimental evidence, 
Garson (2003) has attempted to explain a concept of 
information based upon the pioneering 
electrophysiological ES/BR studies of Edgar Adrian.   
Hubel-Wiesel’s and Adrian’s experiments were similar; 
both consisted of presenting stimuli while measuring the 
electrical responses of single cells.  Although the 
technologies, organisms, cell types, and stimulus types 
differed between Hubel-Wiesel’s and Adrian’s 
experiments; the evidence in both consisted of the 
relations between stimuli and neuronal spike trains, and it 
is this evidence that Garson uses to elucidate a concept of 
information. 
      
To ground his concept of information, Garson argues—in 
accordance with Adrian—that “differences in the 
frequency of the sequence of action potentials map onto 
the differences in the intensity of the stimulus that 
produce them, and not to a constant state of the stimulus.” 
(p. 931).  He argues that differences in stimuli and spike 
trains map to or covary with each other, and that this fact 
captures the sense in which spike trains and stimuli are 
arbitrarily related to each other, thus supporting the 
informational nature of the spike train. 
      
Garson’s argument stands or falls with the truth of 
differential mapping, yet his belief in differential 
mapping, which he takes from Adrian’s work, does not 
correspond to the predominant experimental 
methodology used to acquire evidence in ES/BR studies.  
Since Hubel-Wiesel’s experiments, neuronal responses in 
electrophysiological ES/BR studies are most often 
understood by characterizing the feature selectivity of the 
cell type.  This selectively corresponds to the collection 
of stimulus properties that evoke responses for that cell, 
and highlights the properties that evoke optimal 
responses.  It is based upon the concept of selective 
response that we analyzed above.  Selectivity typically 
involves a non-differential mapping between stimuli and 
responses, it grounds our current understanding of 
sensory cell types, and directly opposes Garson’s concept 
of differential mapping. 
      
But the fact that a scientific community makes use of 
feature selectivity rather than differential mapping to 
acquire evidence does not in itself deny differential 
mapping.   We, too, are questioning the community in its 
interpretations of evidence, although we are not 
challenging its methodology.  Garson argues that the 
differential mapping between stimuli and spike rates 
logically follows from a conjunction of the principle of 
neuronal rate coding with the principle of adaptation: 
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While the principle of rate coding entails that the 
frequency of the sequence of action potentials is 
an exponential function of the magnitude of the 
stimulus, the principle of adaptation entails that 
upon application of a constant stimulus, the 
frequency of the sequence of action potentials 
will diminish, and eventually such outputs will 
stop being produced. Hence the relation between 
the sequence and stimulus is differential. (p. 931) 
 
No further derivation is given, which is concerning since 
each principle taken individually contradicts differential 
mapping in Garson’s sense.  Rate coding is a form of 
non-differential mapping:  a specific stimulus intensity 
directly maps onto a specific frequency of action 
potentials.  How can Garson assume non-differential 
mapping as a premise to establish differential mapping?  
And the principle of adaptation is equally troubling; it 
implies that a negative change in the frequency of action 
potentials maps onto a constant intensity of the stimulus.  
But this directly conflicts with Garson’s claim that 
differences in spike rates map onto differences in 
intensity, and “not to a constant state of the stimulus.”       
      
We agree with Garson that differences in stimuli are 
particularly important to the human organism and other 
animals, but Garson does not logically establish 
differential mapping—nor does the scientific evidence 
primarily support differential mapping—and thus he does 
not reach the goal of deriving a concept of information 
from the evidence.   
 
3.2.3  Summary of ES/BR studies 
 
Rigorous experimental neuroscience has demonstrated 
neurons that selectively respond to a wide range of 
measurable parameters across the senses.  Because 
selective responses reliably covary with stimulus 
properties, we can use mathematical tools to predict 
stimulus properties given spike trains, and predict spike 
trains given stimulus properties.  However, the model of 
the environment communicating messages via spike 
trains is not analogous to Shannon’s communication 
model, at least not unless the scientist who records spike 
trains is included in the model.  Nor is there evidence that 
the neural decoding algorithms proposed by 
neuroscientists actually take place within the brain, and it 
does not seem possible to experimentally show that they 
do using standard ES/BR experiments.  Further, the idea 
that spikes trains carry information is grounded in the 
experimental evidence of selective covariations, but most 
commentators conflate or equate carrying information 
and selective covariation, while others have argued that 
covariation is not even a necessary condition of carrying 
information. 
 
3.3  T/BR studies 
 
Task/brain-response studies combine aspects of S/A and 
ES/BR studies, and our critiques of these studies will 
apply.  In addition to systematically manipulating the 
external environment as in ES/BR studies, T/BR studies 
add to this manipulation a task for the subject to perform.  
The task is similar to an ability in a S/A study, except that 
the task is a transient activity with conditions for 
fulfillment while an ability is an ongoing capacity to act 
in a particular way.   With regard to scientific research, 
tasks should have observable or measurable criteria for 
successful completion, while abilities should have 
observable or measurable criteria for possession of the 
ability.  We can often study a topic using either task or 
ability language.  For instance, in memory studies, we 
can assign subjects the task of memorizing a set or 
numbers, and then ask for those numbers at a later time.  
The task of remembering and the ability to remember are 
similar in that the criteria for completion of the task and 
possession of the ability are equivalent.  If one 
remembers the numbers correctly, one has successfully 
completed the task and possesses the ability to remember.  
      
Let us recall the Poppenk et al. (2010) T/BR study on 
prospective memory described above, where subjects 
were presented a series of visual scenes and instructed to 
either imagine performing an action associated with that 
visual scene (e.g. swinging on a swing when shown a 
swing), or to use the scene as a reminder to perform an 
action the next time the same scene was viewed.  FMRI 
was used to measure brain properties while the subjects 
performed these tasks.  After this task, the subjects were 
taken to a quite room and asked to perform an 
identification test.  They were shown visual scenes on a 
computer and asked to indicate whether each scene was 
studied as an intention, an action, or not seen during 
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scanning at all.  Researchers recorded correct and 
incorrect responses.  The results of the identification test 
were statistically correlated with the fMRI data to 
identify spatiotemporal fMRI activity patterns that 
predicted correct responses on the identification test.  
Given the results, Poppenk et al. speculated that some of 
the identified brain regions enact “processes associated 
with successful encoding of intentions” (p. 911). 
      
This particular T/BR study is more complicated than the 
ES/BR studies of Hubel-Wiesel from an interpretational 
standpoint.  Although T/BR studies are not necessarily 
more complicated than ES/BR studies, the complexity of 
Poppenk et al.’s study is not atypical for fMRI studies 
that include cognitive tasks.  Like S/A and ES/BR studies 
described above, the empirical evidence in this T/BR 
study consists of selective correlations, in this case 
between successful task completion and properties of 
brain areas.  These selective correlations, like those 
described in S/A and ES/BR studies, do not logically 
imply that the function of the identified brain regions is to 
perform a process directly responsible for the task.  
Poppenk et al. make no attempt to understand the 
processes of the identified brain region other than to 
cautiously say that the processes are associated with the 
task, but the observed form of this association is 
statistical correlation. Even if this association was 
selectively causal, we still could not infer that the 
function of the brain region is directly related to 
completing the task, for the causal association could be 
accidental.  And even if the function of the brain region 
involves processes to complete the task, we do not know 
that completing the task involves processing information 
of any kind.   
      
3.4  BM/BR studies 
  
Brain-manipulation/behavioral response studies 
demonstrate the behavioral effects of causally 
manipulating brain properties.   As an example, 
optogenetic studies are a relatively recent advance in 
BM/BR experimentation, and permit precise 
manipulation of neuronal activity. These experiments 
involve expressing light-sensitive genes within specific 
neurons or populations of neurons in living animals.  
When the neurons with the expressed genes are exposed 
to light of a particular wavelength, the activity of the 
neuron will either increase or decrease, allowing for 
precise control of the neuron’s activity.  Presumably the 
expressed genes do not significantly alter the functioning 
of the neuron otherwise.  For example, Wyart et al. 
(2009) expressed light sensitive genes within so-called 
Kolmer-Agdur cells of the zebrafish, and then non-
invasively manipulated the neuronal activity of these 
cells which modulated the swimming behavior of the 
animal. 
      
BM/BR studies establish causal relationships between the 
activity of multiple brain areas or between brain area 
activity and behavioral responses.  Canonical examples of 
BM/BR experiments involve electrical stimulation of 
brain areas resulting in muscle movements.  These types 
of experiments can be traced back to at least Fritsch and 
Hitzig (1870) who applied surface electrodes to dog brain 
and demonstrated that the anatomical location of 
electrical stimulation selectively covaried with 
movements in different muscle groups.  Neuroscientists 
name the structure of this covariation a somatotopic 
organization, and classically explain the relation between 
cerebral cortex and muscle movements with the 
following three hypotheses (Graziano et al. 2002): (1) the 
precentral gyrus, or primary motor cortex, contains an 
explicit topographic map of the body with the foot on the 
top of the cerebral hemisphere, the mouth on the bottom, 
and other parts systematically organized in between; (2) 
the activity at each point in the map specifies the tension 
in a small group of muscle fibers; and (3) cortical motor 
areas are organized in a clear hierarchy of control.  These 
classical hypotheses have been summarized as far back as 
1938 by Fulton, although there is a significant body of 
subsequent evidence that is not compatible with the 
classical theory (Graziano et al. 2002). 
      
Contemporay BM/BR studies of primate motor function 
typically involve inserting microelectrodes into the 
cerebral cortex of an awake animal, and injecting low 
electrical currents into the cellular network while 
simultaneously recording the pattern of muscle 
movements, allowing the researcher to catalog the causal 
relations between electrical stimulation and these 
movements.  One hopes or assumes that the patterns of 
muscle movements in response to exogenous stimulation 
are similar to those caused by endogenous neural activity, 
although the induced electrical activity is clearly non-
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physiologic, complicating any interpretation of the 
results. 
      
If we consider the brain to be a mechanical mechanism, 
what do these motor BM/BR studies tell us about the 
brain?  In other words, knowing that anatomical locations 
of electrical stimulation and patterns of muscle 
movement covary with each other, what can we say about 
the operations or functions that occur in those brain 
areas?  We might say that there is a causal propagation of 
electrical activity, beginning from motor cortical areas 
through the central nervous system and to spinal motor 
nerves that enact patterns of muscle contracture.  If we 
electrically stimulate the brain in other areas, the 
electrical activity does not propagate to spinal motor 
nerves.  The motor cortex therefore acts as a metaphorical 
gateway or hub of electrical activity from CNS to spinal 
nerves, where the pathways are at least partially 
organized with respect to specific muscle movements.   
      
Claims of motor information processing are not needed to 
describe these results, but presumably arise when one 
assumes that areas of the motor cortex naturally represent 
various muscle groups, or that the precentral gyrus 
contains a map of the body, but the fact that electrical 
activity propagates through specific pathways does not 
establish that motor areas naturally represent muscle 
groups.  Just as the idea of a neural code is a sometimes 
useful metaphor for communicating scientific results, the 
idea of a topographic map of the body in the precentral 
gyrus is a useful metaphor for summarizing the data 
about causal organization with respect to electrical 
stimulation. 
      
Compare the structure of the patellar reflex in the 
peripheral nervous system: hitting the patellar tendon 
stretches the quadriceps muscle which activates sensory 
receptors that propagate electrical activity through motor 
neurons that contract the quadriceps.  We can describe 
the propagation of physical changes without any 
reference to information processing or transmission.  Of 
course, one can use a metaphorical information language 
to describe the propagation of electrical activity involving 
the patellar reflex, but this language adds nothing to our 
physical understanding of the reflex.  Electrical activity 
does not propagate randomly through the brain; its 
pathways are organized, and scientists attempt to 
understand this causal organization with respect to an 
organism’s abilities.  BM/BR studies are an important 
tool for understanding this organization, however, 
knowledge of causal organization does not imply 
knowledge of the operations that occur within a brain 
region, nor does it provide evidence of information 
processing. 
      
   
4. Limitations of our argument 
 
 The most obvious concern with our argument is that we 
have only considered a subset of cognitive and 
neuroscience research, and within that subset, only a 
handful of studies.  We then attempted to generalize the 
sorts of functional inferences that are justified given the 
evidence classes we examined.  We justified our 
approach by claiming that the canonical evidence types 
we analyzed are typically taken as evidence that the brain 
processes information, even though the empirical 
reasoning that leads to this scientific proposition has not 
been elucidated.  It is possible that, upon considering 
multiple experiments together, and evidence from 
multiple classes of studies together, one might be better 
able to justify P.  Our analysis was also reductive and 
non-integrative in that we separated evidence types apart 
and argued what each evidence-type alone could tell us 
about brain function.  Nonetheless, no one to our 
knowledge has attempted such an integration to 
positively justify information processing, presumably 
because it has not seemed necessary. 
      
We began this investigation without a specific definition 
of information processing, which may also be taken as a 
short-coming of our argument since information 
processing was assumed to be the theme of this work.  
We counter that our method, instead, was to consider the 
evidence first, and to determine what understanding of 
brain information processing was justified by this 
evidence.  Of course our view of the evidence was biased 
by a priori assumptions, but we purposely attempted to 
refrain from imposing too much on the concept of 
information processing at the start. 
      
In our analysis we neglected the many modeling studies 
in cognitive science.  There is no doubt that mathematical 
modeling will help us understand the functioning of the 
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brain, but we have not addressed modeling efforts in this 
work because modeling in cognitive science is 
underdetermined, and to our knowledge there are no 
cognitive models that are largely accepted as representing 
mental facts.  Further, our criticisms of neural coding and 
decoding procedures apply to cognitive models that 
attempt to relate brain data to environmental stimuli or 
observed behaviors.  A cognitive model that is 
constrained by brain data is essentially a decoding 
procedure—a group of heuristics and algorithms—that 
maps brain data to hypothetical cognitions and vice versa.  
The model is ‘unverifiable’ in that it is impossible to 
show that the model has anything to do with what the 
organism is, for want of infinite regress.  Cognitive 
models that are not constrained by brain data were 
ignored because these models could not empirical justify 
a claim about the brain. We are not, however, suggesting 
that all modeling in neuroscience is problematic.  Models 
that are restricted to physical properties of neurons, or 
populations of neurons and other brain matter and organs, 
help us understand much about the brain. 
       
It may be argued that we misunderstand the methods of 
cognitive scientists.  Cognitive scientists do not attempt 
to verify the presence of particular cognitive operations in 
the brain directly, but rather, they typically begin with a 
priori theories about particular cognitive processes, and 
use the results of relational studies to choose between 
these theoretical cognitive processes (Henson 2006).  One 
might call the claim that the brain processes information 
one of these hypothetical cognitive theories.  We have not 
found empirical support for this cognitive theory, 
although others may interpret the evidence otherwise.  If 
one assumes that selective correlation and causal 
organization imply information carrying, then one will 
see information processing everywhere one looks.  In this 
sense, information processing is not a scientific theory or 
fact, but a basic principle or metaphor that many people 
find useful in communicating and interpreting evidence. 
      
It is perhaps possible to interpret all cognitive science 
evidence to date without affirming that the brain 
processes information, but this claim may sound absurd 
to experts in the field.  Many cognitive scientists assume 
that the brain processes information and direct their 
efforts trying to figure out what specific cognitive 
operations take place in the brain and where in the brain 
they take place.  The theory that the brain performs 
cognitive operations makes these practices possible, but it 
also restricts our search for brain function and our 
potential for ultimately understanding the brain.   
       
We are unsure what sort of evidence would empirically 
justify that the brain processes information, which 
implies, in the end, that we do not know what it means 
for the brain to process information, or what it means for 
a brain structure to enact a cognitive operation.  When we 
look at what the evidence justifies, we can conclude that 
brain activity is selectively correlated with environmental 
stimuli and that the brain shows causal organization with 
respect to stimuli and behaviors.  These facts are enough 
to establish the possibility of predicting between brain 
activity and abilities, and to establish the possibility of 
controlling organism behaviors and (reported) 
perceptions by manipulating brain tissue.   
      
How, then, does theorizing add to the science of 
cognitive science if we deny the presence of cognitive 
operations in the first place?  By focusing upon specific 
abilities, by re-interpreting abilities, by sub-stratifying 
behaviors, by decomposing perceptions into properties or 
categories; the cognitive scientist discovers new 
‘observables’ to correlate with brain activity.  Any 
particular perception (or ability) may be interpreted in 
numerous ways, limited only by one’s creativity.  For 
instance, the image of a face may be decomposed into a 
set of color points, into a set of ‘eigenfaces’,  into a set of 
relative positions of facial landmarks, into 3D surface 
contours, into a set of radial basis functions, etc.  In a 
neuroimaging experiment, the cognitive scientist can 
choose a particular decomposition and see if brain 
activity covaries with differences in the parameter values.  
There is always the tendency to claim that one 
interpretation or decomposition is the true interpretation 
in the sense that the true interpretation is the one that the 
brain ‘naturally uses’.  It is perhaps underappreciated that 
brain activity typically covaries under most 
interpretations, perhaps in different ways, some more 
useful than others. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
 
Information processing, as a natural biological function 
of the brain, is either not established by empirical 
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cognitive neuroscience, or is a metaphor, a folk-
psychological concept that carries an air of scientific 
rigor.  Although not an empirically justified brain 
function, information processing is still a meaningful 
concept that helps researchers communicate complex 
scientific findings.  For instance, it is much easier to say 
that the fusiform face area processes facial information 
than to say that the rate of neuronal firing in the fusiform 
face area is (relatively) selectively correlated with the 
external presentation of facial images—but the later is an 
empirical finding while the former is an over-
interpretation of the data.  While interpretations of data 
are an essential aspect of science, claims that are not 
sufficiently grounded in evidence pose a threat to the 
scientific enterprise and erode the credibility of the field.  
Hanson, a cognitive scientist, raises a similar concern 
about the particular functions assigned to brain 
structures, for when talking about the function of the 
inferior parietal lobe (IPL), he says that “describing the 
IPL in some familiar and yet vague psychological terms 
creates a hopeless muddle of claims and agendas that get 
fossilized in the journals and training of graduate 
students” (Bunzl et al. 2010, p 54.).  Information 
processing, as a general function, is one of those claims.  
      
Cognitive science can proceed without assuming that 
information processing is a natural function of the brain 
and still retain its status as a science independent of 
neuroscience.  Theorizing and interpretations are 
important in cognitive science, but the place of this 
theorizing resides primarily in interpreting abilities, 
behaviors, and stimuli; and not in hastily assigning 
functions to brain structures.  Put another way, all of the 
predicting and controlling that cognitive science 
discovers can and does occur without definitive 
knowledge of brain functions. 
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